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Abstract
Electrical energy is a vital part of modern life, and expectations for grid resilience to allow a contin-
uous and reliable energy supply has tremendously increased even during adverse events (e.g., Ukraine
cyber-attack, Hurricane Maria). The global pandemic COVID-19 has raised the electric energy reliability
risk due to potential workforce disruptions, supply chain interruptions, and increased possible cyberse-
curity threats. The pandemic introduces a significant degree of uncertainly to the grid operation in the
presence of other extreme events like natural disasters, unprecedented outages, aging power grids, high
proliferation of distributed generation, and cyber-attacks. This situation increases the need for measures
for the resiliency of power grids to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic as well as simultaneous ex-
treme events. Solutions to manage such an adverse scenario will be multi-fold: a) emergency planning
and organizational support, b) following safety protocol, c) utilizing enhanced automation and sensing
for situational awareness, and d) integration of advanced technologies and data points for ML-driven
enhanced decision support. Enhanced digitalization and automation resulted in better network visibility
at various levels, including generation, transmission, and distribution. These data or information can be
utilized to take advantage of advanced machine learning techniques for automation and increased power
grid resilience. In this paper, a) we review the impact of COVID-19 on power grid operations and actions
taken by operators/organizations to minimize the impact of COVID-19, and b) we have presented the
recently developed tool and concepts using natural language processing (NLP) in the domain of machine
learning and artificial intelligence that can be used for increasing resiliency of power systems in normal
and in extreme scenarios such as COVID-19 pandemics.
Keywords:— Electric grid resilience, COVID-19, extreme events, power grid operation, machine
learning, data analytics
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1 Introductions
Electricity is essential for individuals’ daily life and the electric power industry is the backbone of the
country’s economy. Interruption in the flow of energy will lead to catastrophic impacts on other in-
frastructures like manufacturers producing essential needs paralyzed, and healthcare systems will come
to a halt. The consequences are unimaginable. It is a matter of national security; during the pan-
demic of COVID-19, “the Department of Homeland Security listed power plants, dams, nuclear reactors,
communications, and transportation systems as critical infrastructure.” [1, 2].
The power grids are actively generating and are continuously being monitored and maintained to
provide continuous and reliable energy for each customer. The transmission ecosystem is under constant
monitoring to assess the condition of the system and to execute appropriate actions if needed. Figure 1
shows the operation and control layout of existing power grids. Distribution control room operators must
Figure 1: Overview of the Power system operation and control
monitor grid load and coordinate with field crews during routine maintenance and unexpected events [3]
for restoring the power due to abnormal circumstances causing outages.
1.1 Background
It is crucial to keep the energy flow. Hence, having a robust contingency and emergency plan is vital. The
energy and utility sector in the U.S. is well planned and designed to withstand contingencies, disasters,
and emergencies. Still, “since 1980, there have been 246 weather and climate disasters exceeding $1.6
trillion in remediation” [4]. Contingency planning has also improved and is reshaped by the pandemics
in the past [5]. Examples of such experiences are the Black Death, 1918 Spanish Flu, the influenza
pandemics of 1957 and 1968, the SARS in the mid-2000s, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza. Nevertheless,
the novel situations caused by COVID-19 with its fast and high scale growth has significantly affected the
utility industry. Most of the contingency and backup plans are designed for physical assets and do not
consider the health of employees [6]. COVID-19 impacted the operators, made them work remotely or
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be quarantined, and consequently, utility operations were affected. Simmons and Stiles [7] and Terry [8]
compare characteristics of COVID-19 and the 1918 Flu and the potential problems that can occur today
due to coupled infrastructure, and [9] reminds of what went wrong and what can be learned from the
1918 Flu. In addition to the bio-hazards, as mentioned in previous paragraphs, the electrical disturbances
caused by weather is increased over the past decades [10]. It is estimated that power outages have cost
the United States economy $18-$33 billion between 2003 and 2012 [11]. The average cost for each weather
event comes around $150,000, and 50 events could happen every year, which results in a loss of $3 million
annually [12]. On a smaller scale, EPB Electric Power in Chattanooga, TN, estimated that the annual
cost of power outages to the community is approximately worth $100 million. Deploying automated
switching and smart meters, they saved about $1.5 million in operational savings during the July 2012
wind storm [13]. According to EPRI, “severe droughts in recent years have sharply reduced hydropower
capacity in the West and Southeast (of USA) by 50%” [14]. According to the survey from IBM, proactive
data-driven solutions can save a significant amount each year. Natural disasters are local (both in time
and space); however, the COVID-19 travels with people at high speed. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether a person can get infected multiple times [15,16]. Preliminary studies suggest antibody can last
only a few weeks or months [17, 18]. If one can get infected more than once, then the severity of the
problem increases. The mortality rate of COVID-19 is estimated at 5% [8] more than double compared
to Spanish Flu at 2%. System operators are highly skilled, and the expertise of an experienced grid
operator is significant. Hence, the replacement of the workforce is challenging in case of any loss.
1.2 Motivation
Due to the novelty of the pandemic and lack of adequate testing kits, operators of a control center became
affected, and consequently, a power generation unit was shutdown [19]. Subsequently, all members of
the electric power industry are actively updating their plans/guidelines in response to the ever-changing
impacts of COVID-19. The Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) is releasing and updating
its Resource Guides, including recommendations for decision-makers of industry [20], and the North
American Reliability Corporation (NERC) provides (and updates) its planning recommendations [21].
To cope with unforeseen events such as pandemics and/or other natural disasters, we need to utilize all
the available tools. Eliminating or reducing manual intervention will ensure resilient and reliable grid
operations during normal situations, in extreme natural events, and under scenarios such as COVID-19
pandemics. It will help utility field crew reduce their exposure to people who could be either symptomatic
of the virus or asymptomatic carriers. These tools not only help in pandemic situations but also are
helpful in general and under normal conditions. The power grid management has evolved with the
invention and advances in computer technologies [22] but is still behind and has not fully utilized the
newly developed research methods. Data analytics and ML tools can play a significant role to formulate
effective solutions and strategies for managing natural events [23]. Moreover, as power systems become
more complex, human operators must work in various situations and may encounter different types of
emergencies [24]. More than two decades ago, in 1998, Bilke stated, “trends in the electric utility industry
have increased the chances and costs of errors by power system operators” [25]. Using more sensors leads
to the collection of more data. Consequently, the analysis of such vast data is beyond the cognitive
capabilities of humans [26], and more tools for assisting the operators are needed [26–28]. Innovative
technologies can improve operator knowledge about the state of the power system and thus make possible
more efficient and reliable operation [29]. Decentralization of power systems, shifting towards smart grids
and consequently more complicated systems, and lack of expert operators all mean the new technologies
and automation have to assist in a bigger role for human operators. Not only machine learning will be
essential on the micro-level to help and take over some of the system operators’ tasks, but also on a
macro level, it is needed for decision-makers to make informed decisions in case of disasters [4].
1.3 Contributions
Most of the recent COVID-19-related papers and reports focused on statistics in the reduction of power
usage and change of demand pattern [30,31]. Some of these papers rushed to analyze the change of pattern
of power consumption. Ref. [31] claims COVID-19 does not solely cause the change in demand pattern.
While these COVID-19-related papers report on impacts on load-demand, economy, and implement
strategies to deal with difficulties of the pandemic [32], the main goal of this paper is to recommend
technical strategies that are not integrated into the industry to date, and these techniques will have a
long impact if the industry adopts them. Increasing “resiliency” of power grids helps utility companies deal
with situations such as COVID-19 along with other natural events. The resiliency usually is defined under
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high-impact low-probability weather events that impact physical assets of power grids. The COVID-19
affected the power grids indirectly by impacting operators. It is shown [33] that early restrictions on
travel are effective, and late restrictions (when the outbreak is widespread) are less effective. Thus,
implementing statistical learning approaches enhances the resiliency of microgrids by reducing the number
of onsite operators.
The fall and winter seasons are coming up in the Northern Hemisphere, and the importance of power
systems’ resiliency cannot be emphasized enough. We have already seen a flood that occurred on May 19
and 20, 2020, in Midland County, Michigan [34], and the Cyclone hurricane has hit India and Bangladesh
on May 20, 2020, having adverse impacts on the power transmission system [35]. The scope of our paper
does not consider an analysis of natural disasters. While planning, operating, and restoring strategies in
response to natural disasters are discussed in a typical review paper (first three rows of Table 1), we only
discuss the methods relevant to pandemic scenarios (last two rows of Table 1).These models increase the
resiliency of the power grid by decreasing the dependency on operators and increasing the automation.
These methods significantly improve the non-physical problems that are ignored for the most part in the
past. Reference [36] reviews some of the ideas related to human resource resilience.
Table 1: High impact, low probability events.
Classification of Events Examples
Physical, manmade Riots, vandalism, war [37–40]
Physical, natural Hurricane, earthquake, storms [41–43]
Cyber Phishing, data injection [44–47]
Non-physical, natural COVID-19, Spanish flu
Contributions of this paper include:
1. Analyzed impact of COVID-19 on power grid operations and actions being taken by operators/organizations
to minimize the impact of COVID-19
2. We review some of the recent methodologies developed for increasing power systems’ resiliency.
3. We suggest integrating some of the recently developed tools or concepts in ML and AI with industry
practices. These approaches can increase the resiliency of power systems in general and in extreme
scenarios such as COVID-19 pandemics.
4. We present a case study of COVID-19 on the RT-RMT tool developed by our team that uses
real-time data for optimal crew routing and restoration process during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, a quick review of the existing power grid
operations is presented. Next, in Sec. 3 impact of COVID-19 pandemic on power grid operations is
analyzed. Afterward, Sec. 4 investigates possible and employed practices to manage and combat the
pandemic effects in normal operations, followed by ML applications for increasing resiliency of power
systems in the future. Finally, we present our conclusions in Sec. 5.
2 Existing Power Grid Operational Practice
Power systems require a level of centralized planning and operation to ensure system reliability.
2.1 Normal Operation
The electric power system is built to handle periodic equipment failures, primarily by isolating faulty
zone, whenever any problems occur. The control room is the brain of a power grid, responsible for the
reliable and secure service of the network. These operations in the power system are a combination
of automated control and actions that require direct human intervention. System operators at control
centers carry out many of these centralized tasks, including short-term monitoring, analysis, and control.
2.1.1 SCADA: Data Acquisition and Control
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) helps in achieving situational awareness and effective
decision making. SCADA is a system of software and hardware elements responsible for gathering, mon-
itoring, and processing real-time data. SCADA acquires measurement information related to voltage,
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current, and frequency, circuit breakers status, monitoring active and reactive power flow, etc. Collect-
ing, processing, and displaying real-time data allows operators to analyze the data via human-machine
interface and enables them to take proper actions remotely from control center. Currently, presence of
operators in the control centers is necessary 24 hours a day. Operators utilize the energy management
system and distribution management system to monitor the state of the system such as the balance
between generation and demand, fault signals, thermal loading of feeders, etc.
2.1.2 Control Center: Situational Awareness and Decision Making
Situation(al) awareness means being constantly aware of the state of power station or grid conditions.
It is a significant contributor to successful control room operations. Observing the early signs of the
system approaching a vulnerable state requires a wide-area view and analytics to recognize the condi-
tion. Situational awareness is vital to enable a coordinated response among operators within a large
organization [48]. Situational awareness gained through SCADA and utilizing sensors such as a smart
meter, phasor measurement unit (PMU), and data acquired through the communication system provides
an opportunity to develop continuous monitoring of the system [47].
Table 2 presents current challenges faced by electrical power systems where ML approaches can
alleviate these problems and help operators in different tasks with decision support tools. Research
methodologies are developed to battle the challenges but are not integrated into the systems yet. Pri-
marily, these approaches will reduce dependency on human operators, which is helpful in situations such
as the COVID-19 pandemic.
2.2 Contingent Operation: Power outage and Restoration
Power outage, restoration, and assessment management plan vary between expected contingency and
emergency operations. The following section will discuss the preparation for events and restoration
efforts during these two modes of operations.
2.2.1 Planning and Training for Normal Expected Contingency
In normal expected contingency operation, utilities prepare for all sorts of circumstances ranging from
small storms, winter snow and ice storms, cyclones, insufficient resources of generation, shortage of fuel
reserves, accidents, cyber-attacks, etc. There are several activities that utilities perform during regular
operation to get prepared for the event in advance:
• Operators and field crews are often engaged in exercise and drills to prepare for various incidents.
• Modernizing physical infrastructure to make it less susceptible to physical or cyber events.
• Utilities do contingency planning and make sure that they can sustain supply even if one or more
system components goes offline.
• Utility performs regular vegetation management, which includes the cutting or trimming of plants,
bushes, and other foliage that could be too near to electric infrastructure to damage equipment
during storms potentially.
• Utilities regularly examine their resources to make a note of any deterioration and any required
fixes or replacement.
2.2.2 Planning and Resilient Operation for Emergency
During emergency operation mode, utilities coordinate control room operators and crews to re-establish
power supply as fast as possible. If the event is known beforehand, then utility planning will be in two
phases, pre-event and post-event.
Pre-Event Process:
• Utility will create different leads for different functions (e.g., damage, restoration, vegetation man-
agement, overall communications).
• Review critical infrastructure in the area.
• Utilities identify resources which include crews, backup generators, and other equipment, and mu-
tual assistance that are available to respond to an emergency.
• Utilize advanced tools to anticipate extreme events and prepare the system to have minimal impact.
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Table 2: Challenges for the power grid operation and control in extreme events.
Field Challenge Opportunity (Developed Methods) Refs.
Control
Center
Fault detection due to incomplete
and conflicting alarms.
Data-driven based on mixed
integer linear programming.
[49]
Increasing number of
measurement devices increases
the number of alarms causing
analysis and situational awareness
challenges.
Real-time event detection using
synchrophasor data, and ensemble
methodology that includes
maximum likelihood estimation,
DBSCAN, and decision trees.
[50]
Fault section estimation Neural Networks [51–54]
Classify the observed anomalies of
instrument transformers into
different types of malfunction,
failure, or degradation.
A pipeline consisting of three
steps; maximum likelihood
estimation, DBSCAN and a
decision logic diagram.
[55]
Office Staff Classifying the customer ticket
texts/calls.
Natural language processing, text
analytics, recurrent Neural
networks.
[56]
Transmission
protection
systems
Detecting root cause of failure in
transmission protection systems.
Not being able to do so causes
propagation of faults,
consequently results in multiple
conflicting alarms.
Anomaly detection using an
ensemble of ML approaches.
[57]
System
Protection -
Cyber
Security
Monitoring and detecting
malicious activity in transmission
protection systems.
Anomaly detection pipeline that
includes LSTM networks,
semi-supervised deep learning
algorithm, and ridge regression.
[47]
Classifying malicious data and
possible cyber-attacks.
Several ML algorithms such as
random forests and support
vector machine.
[45]
Detecting anomalies and false
data injection.
Gaussian mixture model is used
to solve the problem.
[58]
Detecting intrusion in smart grids. Support vector machine andartificial immune system.
[46]
Post-Event Process:
• Utilities perform a destruction estimation of lines and substations.
• Utility will eliminate all hazardous situations such as downed live wires or potentially life-threatening
situations.
• Restore power plant and transmission lines that carry maximum power to the distribution system
if damaged.
• Utility will first restore power to critical infrastructures such as hospitals, police, and fire stations
then to individual homes and small businesses.
• Utilize advanced resiliency tools to optimize and recover after an extreme event.
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3 Impact of COVID-19 on the Power Grid Operation
In a report [59], Edison Electric Institute states that “it is predicted that a large percentage of a company’s
employees (up to 40%) could be out sick, quarantined, or might stay home to care for sick family
members.” Moreover, certain nuclear facilities have operated marginally at low capacity due to remote
operations and the challenges due to delayed maintenance work, which is impacting the timely operation
of such facilities. Furthermore, COVID-19 is expected to delay project developments and also would
impact renewable auctions due to supply chain delays. The pandemic has forced the NERC to delay
implementation of several reliability standards [60, 61], some of which are cybersecurity measures. The
pandemic has forced utilities to operate with skeleton workers, thus, providing more opportunities for
cyber-attackers [20]. Three infected IT security engineers at a nuclear power plant were quarantined
for 14 days [19], increasing the risks that threaten normal operations. State of the art technologies in
AI and ML can aid in reducing humans’ direct involvement with overseeing, maintaining, and failure
detection [57]. Protection systems are always of the highest priority in the energy industry. By opening
the system and working remotely, the importance of protections grows tremendously as the system
becomes more vulnerable. For increased security against cyber-attacks, extra measurements have to be
taken (see [47]). Figure 2 shows statistics of cyber-attacks on components of power systems from 1994 up
to 2004 [44] that indicates which parts of the power grid are more vulnerable and needs more attention
against attackers.
Figure 2: Cyber attacks on power grid worldwide during 1994-2004.
(a) New York’s demand pattern. (b) California’s demand pattern.
(c) Northwest region’s demand pattern. (d) Northern Italy’s load pattern.
Figure 3: COVID-19 impact on demand behavior in three regions in the US and in Northern
Italy.
COVID-19 impacted power demand, mostly when the lockdown periods went into effect. Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI) reported the change of pattern of load in Italy, Spain, and the U.S. [62].
Load impacts in the U.S. were also reported in [7, 63,64].
Figure 3 compares the power consumption in 2020 and 2019 in various regions of the U.S. and Italy
when the pandemic became widespread, and lockdowns started. The data for the U.S. is obtained from
Energy Information. The data for Italy is obtained from ENTSO-E Transparency [65]. The lockdown
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started on March 19 [66] in the state of California. The demand in California was higher before the
lockdown starts in 2020 compared to 2019. However, after the lockdown, it dropped below that of 2019
by a small amount. The Northwest region includes several states; therefore, there is no definite date
for the beginning of the lockdown, and no clear change of pattern is seen in this region. In the state
of New York, lockdown started on March 22 [67]. Here, the demand in 2020 is less than the demand
in 2019, even before the lockdown period begins. One might wonder some other factors (other than
COVID-19) might be involved in the difference between consumption loads of 2020 and 2019. Ruan et
al. [68] have made an ensemble model to predict electricity consumption in NYISO in 2020 if COVID-19
were absent. They trained 800 neural network models and picking the top 25% models with the lowest
error. For some selected days in April, it is shown that electricity consumption is much lower than that
of predicted by the model. Table 3 presents reduction of power consumption in different countries in
2020 compared to 2019. The reduction of electricity usage translates into a reduction of the system’s
resilience. Furthermore, most of the reduction of demand results from a reduction of electricity usage
by large segments such as industrial and commercial organizations. These customers form a large part
of the electricity demand, and their lack of stability translates into a reduction of stability in power grid
operations.
In the U.K., the transportation system is one of the large consumers of electricity. On the week of
March 23rd, 2020, the consumption of electricity in the transmission system of the U.K. dropped ap-
proximately 10% compared to the same time in 2019. Furthermore, the consumption of the transmission
system kept falling week after week; “compared to the week of March 9th, total electricity demand fell
by 13% in the week of March 23rd, by 14% in the week of March 30th, and by 24% in the week starting
April 6th." [69]. Europe went through a significant reduction (27%) during lockdowns. Even after ease
of the lockdowns in June, the demand was still 10% less than that of 2019 [70].
Table 3: Comparison of demand in different regions and time periods.
Country Demand reduction Time Window Refs.
USA 5.4% Week of April 6, 2020 compared
to the same time in 2019
[71]
NYISO
(USA)
9% reduction in peak
demand
March 2020 compared to 5-year
average values
[32]
CAISO
(USA)
5%-8% load reduction
in weekdays
Since statewide shutdown on
March 20 compared to 2019.
[72]
Europe 27% The first week in February to
the end of March in 2020
compared to 2019.
[73]
France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and
Netherlands.
10% The first week in February to
the end of March in 2020
compared to 2019.
[73]
India 30% Since full national lockdown on
March 24.
[74]
Some interesting results such as the impact of social distancing on electricity consumption, or number
of daily visits to restaurants can be found in [68].
To prevent the spread of the virus, operators and technicians have to change their normal operations.
Different solutions are put forward by experts. The followings are some examples of the pandemic impact
and potential actions to consider.
• Minimizing the number of onsite staff and working remotely if possible.
• Using main and backup control rooms at different times and/or with separate operators.
• Sterilizing control center facilities during the day regularly.
• Changing shift duration and cycles.
• Limiting common equipment usage.
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• Cancelling face-to-face meetings and direct interactions.
• Field technicians drive with a limited number in each vehicle and also carry personal protective
equipment.
• Close all non-critical common areas, such as exercise room, or even the cafeteria.
4 Solutions for Minimizing Impact of COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic changed the usual operations at different levels. Recently, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and NERC guided industry to reduce the impact of COVID-19 [75],
and a comprehensive guide is given by [76].
4.1 Actions Being Taken by Grid Operators
Operators are taking different actions to minimize the spread and impact of COVID-19 virus while
attending their jobs and maintaining the power stations. Below is a list of some of these strategies.
• Back-up control centers are activated, key workers are isolated and deep cleaning has become a
routine [77].
• Food and other supplies stored at the generating station (Utah’s Intermountain Power Plant) [78].
• Preparing for worst-case scenario; “we could operate the plant with a skeleton crew for an extended
period of time” (Utah’s Intermountain Power Plant). An example is shown in Fig. 4 provided by [79],
demonstrating New York’s power grid control operation working with only essential operators.
• Employees are telecommuting. (Southern California Edison, NYPA)
• Sharing personnel among power line repair teams are kept at minimum (Southern California Edi-
son) [78].
• Non-critical planned maintenance are postponed (Southern California Edison).
• Critical workers are isolated (American Gas Assn.). In fact, “some sequestration is underway in
certain areas, with employees and contractors living on-site at power plants and other facilities.
It is critical that sequestered employees who are in close quarters be tested before and during
sequestration” [19].
• Regular health screenings and deep cleanings the control rooms to keep the coronavirus out (NYPA) [80].
• Splitting control center operators between the main and backup control center to limit contact
(PJM) [80].
Figure 4: Control center normal operations are impacted by COVID-19. Power systems are
operating with minimal number of staff onsite.
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4.2 Enabling Grid Resiliency
Other than the usual operational paradigm to focus on reliability, security, restoration, and emergency
planning, one needs to invest on resiliency to bounce back from extreme events. Resiliency is a multidi-
mensional concept. Jufri et al. [81] state resiliency “involves multidisciplinary knowledge, such as power
system, civil and structure, geography, computer science, probability, and meteorology and climatology.”
Consequently, several definitions are available. Even for one aspect of resiliency, several definitions have
been put forward and there is no consensus in a given community. Definitions for a given aspect are
not mutually exclusive and may overlap [82]. Table 4 provides some of the definitions of resiliency from
different perspectives and/or in different domains and some closely related topics. For more details please
see [82, 83]. As mentioned before, most of the effort on resiliency is focused on the physical assets. In
Table 4: Definitions of resilience and other coupled/interrelated concepts.
Concept Definition Refs.
Resiliency Ability to harden the power system against—and
quickly recover from high-impact, low-frequency
events. Resiliency consists of damage prevention,
system recovery, and survivability.
[84]
Damage prevention
(as a part of
resiliency)
Damage prevention is self-explanatory. It is related to
predicting and hardening the power systems against
high-impact, low-frequency events.
[84]
System recovery
(as a part of
resiliency)
Going back to normal operations after occurrence of
high-impact, low-frequency events.
[84]
Survivability
(as a part of
resiliency)
Ability to maintain some basic level of power to
consumers when complete access to their normal
power sources is not possible.
[84]
Resiliency “measure of a system’s ability to absorb continuous
and unpredictable change and still maintain its vital
functions.”
[82]
Resiliency in
organizational
domains
“ability of an organization to absorb strain and
improve functioning despite the presence of adversity.”
[82]
Reliability “the degree to which the performance of the elements
of [the electrical] system results in power being
delivered to consumers within accepted standards and
in the amount desired.”
[85]
Flexibility “the inherent capability to modify a current direction
to accommodate and successfully adapt to changes in
the environment.”
[86]
this paper, however, we are dealing with a pandemic of a disease that adds another dimensionality to the
problem; health. Consequently, the organizational domain becomes relevant and a definition of resiliency
for this aspect is given in Table 4. By implementing ML approaches,the resiliency of a power–system as
a group/society/organization–is increased and shifted from humans to machines.
In general, the resiliency of a power grid is defined as “the ability to withstand and fast recovery
from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents” [87]. For a system to be
resilient, it needs to have a robust damage prevention plan in place, and a system designed for adaptation
and fast recovery in case of any damage. Temporally there are 3 stages to make, keep and improve the
system’s resiliency (Fig. 5) pre-, during, and post- event actions are needed. The extreme events cause
a limited or complete blackout in the power grid. A complete blackout occurs with a low probability
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Figure 5: Multi-temporal resilience framework
as a result of multiple interrelated contingencies; operators hardly anticipate that. If pandemics such as
COVID-19 coincide with extreme weather events, then the problem escalates to a whole another level
where the consequences are extremely high for at least two reasons. The first reason being the regulations
and limitations regarding the COVID-19 for operators on the power grid that increases difficulties on its
own. For example, less number of technicians to fix failures, more chance for cyber-attackers. The second
reason is that hospitals (a very specific example is ventilators) depend on electricity [88]: “... electric
power is not just important for the overall functioning of the facility, it is critical for direct patient care.”
Automation and ML can aid in different ways to increase the resiliency of the networks. For example,
ML can help evaluate the risk of failure and consequently with scheduling a timely maintenance [89]. The
resiliency has to be implemented at multiple levels, as different incidents threaten the system. Examples
of such events are extreme weather conditions, cyber-attacks, human errors, and pandemics such as
COVID-19, to name a few.
Different approaches that can enhance the resiliency of power grid are discussed here.
4.2.1 Microgrids and DERs
Although rigorous efforts and suitable solutions to strengthen the resiliency of the power grid are con-
tinuously evolving, the operator still needs to deal with challenging conditions due to unprecedented or
adverse events. With the increased deployment of DERs and microgrids, the reliability and resiliency of
the power grid can significantly be enhanced [90]. By reconfiguration of the network, DERs can be used
to serve critical loads when the utility grid or a centralized generation unit is not available [91]. Similar
to DERs, microgrids could operate independently or in connection with the distribution network [92,93].
Furthermore, a microgrid can be used to pick up critical loads outside its boundary to increase the re-
siliency of power grids in case of extreme events [94]. Consequently, smart grids and distributed renewable
energy systems can be a solution in the future [95] to alleviate problems imposed by pandemics.
Despite the fact that microgrids increase the resiliency of power systems, they face their own chal-
lenges. To learn more about these challenges (e.g. physical or cyber threats) please see Mishra et al. [96].
Table 5 provides a summary of some of these challenges and some of the methodologies developed by
researchers to overcome the difficulties.
4.2.2 Operational Practice for Human Operators
Operational practice guidelines and decision-making tools help the operator to apply the best plan to
minimize the impact of an event, but mainly for known and analyzed ones. Effective proactive strategies
with quantified measures in terms of resiliency metric can lead to substantial improvement in resilient
power distribution grids [101–103], [104, 105]. Training for extreme events will be important. Further,
any advancement in automatic decision-making tools based on data processing and analysis will ease the
operator in handling these events [106]. An automatic emergency control action plan can be developed
based on previous incidents and suggested to operators or used as an emergency automated operation.
Distancing employees and scheduling operating cycles for minimal interactions with others during health
hazards like COVID-19 stops escalation of impact to employees, specifically to control center operators
and field crew which are treated as critical personnel of utility companies.
4.2.3 Organizational Support
Organizational support plays a major role in a resilient grid operation especially given that multiple or-
ganizations impact grid operations including federal, state and city governmental bodies, FERC, NERC,
public utility commission, vendors, service providers, technical committees, standard development or-
ganizations, researchers and of course consumers. With proper support and guidelines from regulation
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Table 5: Microgrids challenges
Component Challenge Opportunity (Developed Methods) Refs.
System
Protection -
Cyber
Security
Detect and stop cyber attacks
in wireless sensor networks
in microgrids.
Detecting anomaly based on the lower and
upper bound estimation method to predict
optimal intervals over the smart meter
readings at electric consumers. They make
use of the combinatorial concept of
prediction intervals to solve the instability
issues arising from the NNs.
[97]
Utility grid
connected
microgrids
Microgrids with distributed
generation increase resiliency of
power systems in case of any
faults. Microgrids and using
ML in their routine operations
gives time and space to operators
to fix the damaged components.
A NN is developed to provide
cooperative voltage regulation for a
microgrid that can be applied locally, in
a privacy preserving way.
[98]
Enhancing protection for
modernization of distribution
system against faults.
A NN and support vector machine is
used for state recognition and state
diagnosis.
[99]
Fault
detection
Detecting events in each of the
distributed stations.
Modified ensemble of bagged decision
trees with an added boosting method
[100]
authorities and federal energy agencies, utility companies could accelerate the deployment of advanced
grid technologies to perform remote operations and increase the level of automation with sufficient per-
sonnel involvement. Organizations need to develop policy, proactive or corrective action plans against
extreme weather (Tsunamis, Hurricanes, Tornadoes, etc.), and biohazards (COVID-19, Ebola, etc.). As
the grid is highly susceptible to cyber threats during these kinds of events, robust communication in-
frastructures and adaptive action plans must be implemented. During bio-hazards, automated alarm
and text messaging of outages, faults, equipment failures, and malfunctioning to crew engineers and field
inspectors should be deployed that can reduce infection spread and loss of crew. Besides, automated
routing of field personnel to equipment maintenance and replacement with a minimal customer or hu-
man interactions can ensure continuous power supply. Moreover, optimal placement of inventory and
crew by organization diminishes power delivery interruptions to minimum time possible. Further, mutual
coordination and personnel exchange between organizations operating in the same region could result in
establishing a resilient and robust grid.
4.2.4 Redundancy and Automation
Restoration is a key functionality of an advanced distribution management system (ADMS) for keeping
the lights on after an outage. Redundancy plays a vital role in the restoration process and spare inventory
and parallel lines act as major attributes to that. Outage management system (OMS) identifies the
faulted section with information received from trouble call or field inspector and dispatch crew to mend
damaged equipment [10]. An increased number of multiple power flow paths in the network permits
the load to be supplied through alternate path [29]. Modern grid technologies like automatic metering
infrastructure (AMI), micro-phasor measurement units(microPMU), intelligent electronic devices (IED),
fault indicators, remote terminal units (RTUs), digital relays and circuit breakers, data analytical tools
provides enhanced observability and controllability of distribution network [10, 107]. Field devices can
be used to automate the power grid through ML techniques. For example, predicting the probability of
failure of a feeder switch can help prevention of outages. In the case of COVID-19 also, redundancy of
spare devices and automation will help in faster restoration.
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4.3 Future ML based Tools and Resiliency
The need for increasing system resiliency has heightened by several recent natural events and their
dramatic impacts. But natural disasters are just one major cause of high-impact outages [108]. An
example of this kind is human-caused outages applicable in the COVID-19 case. Making the operators
work longer hours or sequestering them to live on-site at power plants will increase the human error
rate. With the increasing complexity, the tasks of human operators become even more challenging.
Unlike a self-driving car, a fully automated scenario without human intervention is not possible due to
complexity of the power grid. ML-based tools could help to minimize over-burden on operators and
hence minimize chances of human errors. We view the possibilities that statistical learning and recently
developed techniques can provide to combat the power grid challenges as outlined here.
ML and natural disasters. Gupta et al. [109] employ a probabilistic framework and support vector
machine to predict cascading failure and provide early warning in case of any future events to increase
resiliency. Eskandarpour and Khodaei [110] develop an ML-based prediction method to determine the
potential outage of power grid components in response to an imminent hurricane. The decision boundary
of the classifier is obtained via logistic regression to predict the number of failed components and failure
duration. Predicting the state of a system after a hurricane is investigated in [111] using a support vector
machine-based model to categorize power grid components into two classes–damaged and operational.
Guikema [112] uses regression and data mining techniques to estimate the number of poles that need to
be replaced after a hurricane event. Glavic et al. [113] and Huang et al. [114] explore the application of
reinforcement learning in power system emergency control dynamics to alleviate current practices.
ML and cyber attacks. Hink et al. [45] explore several ML algorithms–such as random forests
and support vector machine– to classify “malicious data and possible cyber-attacks” to help operators
in normal and emergency situations. Foroutan and Salmasi [58] investigate a Gaussian mixture model
for detecting anomalies and compare their model against some other models for false data injection.
Zhang et al. [46] examine a distributed intrusion detection system embedded at each level of the smart
grid—the home area networks, neighborhood area networks, and wide area networks using the support
vector machine and artificial immune system.
Protection systems are an important part of the system, yet, they are prone to external influences
as well. Multiple alarms reported in the control center could be a result of the faults or failures in
the protection system (unexpected operation). Ahmed et al. [47] develop a ML technique to monitor
transmission protection systems and detect malicious activity using long short-term memory (LSTM).
These data are also utilized for failure diagnosis. Finally, a model to find the root causes of the observed
events assisted by the cyber log data from the protection devices are developed. Anomaly detection in
PMUs is further discussed in [57] to detect the root cause of the failure in the transmission protection
system, and it is shown that ensemble models are superior to standalone methods.
Utilizing topological data analytics in anomaly detection in power grid studies are limited. Two
examples of topological data analytics are [115, 116]. Topological data analytics in [116] is used to
identify the divergent subpopulation in phenomics data throughout the growth period of plants. Such an
approach might have the potential to detect the root cause of failures and early warning when equipment
starts to behave abnormally. Furthermore, ML is also being explored for cyber situational awareness
[117].
ML-based tools to supplement operators. ML can help the operators in a variety of ways. For
example, it can be used to classify the customer ticket texts into different categories [56] such as serious
events or else. Natural language processing and/or recurrent neural networks can be used to analyze
customers’ trouble calls to pinpoint the location of the faulty equipment as opposed to operators taking
the calls. By automating this process, interaction among operators will be minimized as needed in the
case of COVID-19.
For dispatchers and operators to manage a power grid correctly and efficiently, they need to under-
stand the behavior and the current state of the grid. Using alarms generated by SCADA is one of their
tools. The rate of alarm generation can be reduced significantly (98%) by using intelligent alarm pro-
cessing system which is a great improvement for operators and dispatchers [118]. This is very important,
especially in emergencies, since the long work shifts and high levels of stress that occur over times of
emergency (such as COVID-19) make operators even more prone to mistakes [119]. Furthermore, ML can
be utilized to classify the alarms and hence reduce the workload of operators. Employing ML can help
to identify multiple events associated with a set of reported alarms. Consequently, helping the operators
and reducing the cognitive burden.
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4.4 A case study
A real-time resiliency management tool (RT-RMT) is a unique tool developed by the authors’ team. It
computes the resiliency score of any power system network by considering the various parameters. This
tool also encompasses geospatial information of the power grid, asses an infrastructure that helps to
compute resilience scores during the propagation stages of natural threats or events. Mainly three stages
of events such as pre, during, and post-event resiliency scores are computed considering factors related
to generation, critical and non-critical loads, threat type and impact model including available backup
resources, inventory, field crew, and inspection team, and weather information. The real-time resiliency
score is computed every 15 minutes using the information acquired through communication systems from
different components (e.g. SCADA, PLC, RTUs) in the distribution system. It can be deployed along
with a commercial distribution management system. RT-RMT provides real-time operational topology
or configuration on a live tracking map shown in Fig. 6. Further, it displays the connection between
different nodes of the network and routing over the GIS layer. It can be adapted to analyze the impact of
health hazards(e.g., COVID-19) and can effectively minimize its influence on the electrical distribution
system.
Figure 6: RT-RMT tool view: Normal operating condition.
Figure 7: RT-RMT tool view: Spread of COVID-19 cases across Washington state with
blue being lowest and red being the highest number of cases.
RT-RMT tool has four main windows; system information, resilience monitoring, decision support,
and planning analysis. System information discloses the number of nodes, transformers, fault indicators,
protection devices, other equipment, and their ratings along with deployed location and current operating
status. Resilience monitoring captures the real-time resiliency score for a given system. This value will
change subject to operating conditions (i.e variations in the generation, loads connected, etc). The
decision support on RT-RMT helps the operator to take appropriate actions suggested by the tool to
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boost the resiliency of the system that includes pre-, during, and post-event requirements as the event
progress with different stages. RT-RMT emphasizes on enhancing the resilient system operation by
incorporating future assets, modern communication technologies, etc.
Two use cases are developed to evaluate the performance of the RT-RMT tool. The first use case
focuses on the normal operation of the distribution system without any event. The evaluated resiliency
score for a given operating condition is near to 0.9 as shown in Fig. 6. The second use case includes the
COVID-19 pandemic and how RT-RMT will be adapted to help the operators in addressing the problems
with minimal impact on the electrical power supply and all the consumers. The data used in this scenario
are obtained from John Hopkins’ Coronavirus dataset [120] and are anonymized to avoid data privacy
issues. Different regions with different intensities of COVID- 19 cases are shown in different colors in Fig.
7 over the distribution system in a live tracking map. This tool informs the operators (visually) about
areas with high cases of COVID- 19. Consequently, they can decide to change any scheduled maintenance
plan or repair a failed equipment plan as needed. The operator may address the issues in regions with a
low number of COVID cases, first with precautions. For example, by sending limited crew per vehicle.
RT-RMT also optimizes the route to avoid the paths going through regions with a high number of cases
to protect crew members against infections. The operator could also plan to send crew members at once
in a day along with medical kits so that minimal contact of humans can be ensured. Further, effective
reconfiguration of the network can also be performed in the region with high positive cases to restore the
power after an outage or equipment failure so that electrical supply is still maintained without field crew
inspection and replacement of faulty equipment.”Detailed explanation is provided in the section 4.4.1.
Digital query assistant is developed using NLP and plugged to the RT-RMT tool with the name
“Ask Virtual Assistant” as shown in Fig. 6. This can be used to dig the required information from the
database where high data volumes from the power system network are stored. A virtual assistant will
ease operator search for finding the necessary information during normal operating scenarios as well as
emergency situations (such as outages, weather-related events, pandemics ), and also lessen the cognitive
burden on operators to reduce human errors in control decisions. A typical demonstration is showcased
here by asking the query “what node has the lowest voltage” and results will pop up with a small window
over the main screen as shown in Fig. 8. This can be further enhanced with virtual voice assistant similar
to Google and Apple application which help the operator to ease the finding process.
Figure 8: Virtual assistant demonstration on RT-RMT.
4.4.1 Use case of RT-RMT for optimal crew routing during COVID-19 pandemic
The distribution test system is a 45-node simplified distribution network that is remote and with a large
DER supporting most of the operation, as shown in Fig. 6. The dataset for the COVID-19 is derived from
the CORD-19 (COVID-19 Open Research Dataset) presented by Wang et al. [121]. In normal operating
conditions, the RT-RMT only supports operator actions while tracking the resilience performance of the
system. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the authors developed a safe crew-routing algorithm,
presented in Fig. 9 that solves the crew routing problem for system repairs. It then filters the solution
set for the crew route and schedules a path with the least risk of contracting COVID-19. The filtered
solution set is then subject to a comparative analysis through the resilience metrics to identify the most
15
resilient crew route and is visualized in the RT-RMT live map for operator sign-off. The resilience metric
that captures the resilience performance of the system after the extreme event has ended gathers the
resilience indicators that inform the rapidity of recovery for each restoration plan that is proposed by
the operator.
Figure 9: Safe crew dispatch algorithm.
A vector of recover resilience indicators (R = [Tr, Cr, τ, CLr, SO]) is formed for each path. The
indicator Tr represents the total repair time, Cr represents the cost of repairs, τ represents the topological
resilience coefficient that is based on graph-theoretical spectral metrics [101], CLr represents the number
of critical loads restored in the process, and SO is the number of switching operations. For each path,
the vector R is computed, and the analytical hierarchical process [104] is applied to find the composite
resilience score. Resilience is maximally enabled when the operator selects a path with the highest
resilience metric score.
A simple eight-node repair scenario is analyzed in the test system from Fig. 7. Once the RT-RMT
obtains the damage assessment scenario, the resilience computation engine applies the routing algorithm
to get the lowest weight route with the GIS, COVID-19 data, repair information, and scheduling require-
ments so that exposure of field crew to COVID-19 hotspots is avoided. Figure 7 shows the main operator
screen with the resilience metrics calculations. The position of each node and relative proximity with
COVID-19 hotspots is displayed on the tool UI (Fig. 10). Three routes are analyzed using the resilience
metrics analysis, and the most resilient option that is also the safest is chosen. Safest route with avoided
zones is shown in Fig.10.
5 Conclusions
As observed over the last several years, the frequency and intensity of natural disasters and extreme
events and associated impact on the power grid have been increasing. Pandemics such as COVID-19 add
to the challenge and push the organizations to their limits. Driven by smart grid investment, the power
grid is moving towards massive sensor deployment and automation. Enhanced digitalization resulted
in the collection of massive data, which is beyond the capacity of human operators to analyze, make a
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Figure 10: Screen capture of RT-RMT showing the asset information with repair
instructions, scheduling with no-go zones, and the routing on the map with crew-routing
algorithm.
timely decision and respond to extreme events. Below, we list current limitations and possible future
solutions for them.
1. Growing number of measuring devices and data collected by them is increasing the alarming rate,
frequency and is beyond humans’ abilities to analyze. The situation becomes even more severe
in pandemic scenarios when a limited number of experts have to be onsite or work long hours,
causing fatigue. Growing connectivity is increasing the vulnerability of power grids by itself, and
in a situation such as COVID-19, where experts work remotely and via VPNs, the security is
threatened even more.
2. Humans need to take calls from customers’ to detect and pinpoint the location of failures in the
power grid system.
3. Centralized power systems are a limitation, and they are being decentralized and shifted towards
microgrids.
Future directions include:
1. Implementing ML approaches to replace much of the tasks of humans. In this case, ML helps
control centers’ experts. As is reported by too many resources such as [32], lots of control center
experts staff had to work long hours, which leads to tiredness (other problems exist as well), which
leads to making mistakes.
2. Implementing ML approaches to detect suspicious changes in the power grid to protect it against
cyberattacks, especially in a case such as COVID-19 when they must work remotely. This is
beneficial for IT staff.
3. Statistical learning techniques such as natural language processing can be employed to analyze
incoming calls of customers to pinpoint the location of failures in the power grid system. Perhaps
ML approaches can be helpful to detect failed devices/locations automatically, even without taking
calls. This helps customer operations and office staff.
4. Probability theory for rare disease modeling [122] has been around, but, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been taken advantage of in the resiliency context. Research about Bayesian methods devel-
oped for rare diseases can be analyzed and applied in the power grid resiliency context. Moreover,
since health and conditions are a new dimension in our current resiliency problem, the probability
theory of rare diseases is relevant.
5. Opinion dynamics have been studied for about 50 years, but it has attracted a lot of attention
relatively recently [123, 124]. In the past few years, opinion dynamics are being used against
attacks on networks [125–127]. Therefore, combining machine learning and opinion dynamics has
the potential to be used and applied to power grids against cyber-attacks as well.
In this paper, the impact of COVID-19 on power grid operations has been analyzed. Actions being
taken by operators/organizations to minimize the effects of COVID-19 has been discussed in detail.
Solutions have been suggested by utilizing the recently developed tools or concepts in ML and AI for
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increasing resiliency of power systems in general and in extreme scenarios such as COVID-19 pandemics.
Suggested tools assist operators in taking control actions and allow fewer humans interventions while
utilizing more and more data integration from diverse sources in an intelligent manner. Data-driven
ML and AI could benefit operators for managing the system’s resiliency, decision making, and disaster
management in a better way –e.g., by prediction of disaster impact and anomaly detection as well as
overlapping the COVID-19 hotspots with electricity service map for restoration safely.
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